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use#OAPDISGORGEMENT AS AN ANTITRUST REMEDY
EINER ELHAUGE*
My topic is an antitrust remedy that is legally available, enormously
powerful, but seldom used—disgorgement. I want to ask what explains
the rare usage of this remedy in antitrust cases and whether the reasons
for its historic backstage status continue to apply today to dominant firm
misconduct. More provocatively, given the growing obstacles to private
and class action damage suits and the frequent ineffectiveness of behav-
ioral and structural remedies for monopolization, is it time for disgorge-
ment to assume center stage as an antitrust remedy? While my
comments will focus on U.S. law, I also offer some observations about
how disgorgement theory might offer a way to better explain, and cabin,
the otherwise puzzling EU claim of excessive pricing.
I. LEGAL AVAILABILITY AND CONVENTIONAL
REASONS FOR RARE USAGE
One’s first reaction might well be that perhaps the rare usage reflects
some underlying insecurity about whether disgorgement really is a per-
missible antitrust remedy. But there is surprisingly little doubt that equi-
table antitrust remedies include requiring violators to disgorge any
illegally obtained profits. In United States v. Paramount Pictures, the Court
held that injunctions to deprive the defendant of the fruits of its an-
ticompetitive conduct should include injunctions ordering the defen-
dant to divest property
if the property was acquired . . . as a result of practices which constitute
unreasonable restraints of trade. Otherwise, there would be reward
from the conspiracy through retention of its fruits. Hence the problem
of the District Court does not end with enjoining continuance of the
unlawful restraints nor with dissolving the combination which
launched the conspiracy. Its function includes undoing what the con-
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Doug Melamed, Bill Rubenstein, and the participants in the ABA Section of Antitrust Law
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spiracy achieved . . . . [T]he requirement that the defendants restore
what they unlawfully obtained is no more punishment than the famil-
iar remedy of restitution.1
This language seems broad enough not only to authorize the govern-
ment to bring antitrust claims seeking the disgorgement of any
supracompetitive profits causally related to antitrust violations, but even
to require doing so in any case where other remedies do not suffice to
deprive a violator of all its illicit fruits. Other Supreme Court cases are
equally emphatic. In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., the
Court stated: “It is of course established that, in a § 2 case, upon appro-
priate findings of violation, it is the duty of the court to prescribe relief
which will . . . deny to the defendant the fruits of its statutory violation
. . . .”2 And the Court in United States v. Grinnell held that “adequate relief
in a monopolization case should . . . deprive the defendants of any of
the benefits of the illegal conduct . . . .”3
To be sure, none of these Supreme Court antitrust cases involved the
disgorgement of cold hard cash. However, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion has sought monetary disgorgement as injunctive relief and had its
authority to do so upheld in many cases.4 The recent Bush administra-
tion Department of Justice took the position that it had the authority to
seek disgorgement for antitrust violations, and both the Bush and Clin-
ton Departments of Justice actually obtained disgorgement in contempt
actions for violations of consent decrees.5 The Areeda treatise concurs
that antitrust “equity relief may include . . . the disgorgement of improp-
erly obtained gains.”6 Indeed, the Antitrust Modernization Commission
1 334 U.S. 131, 171–72 (1948).
2 391 U.S. 244, 250 (1968).
3 384 U.S. 563, 577 (1966). See also Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334
U.S. 110, 128–29 (1948) (equitable relief functions include: “It deprives the antitrust de-
fendants of the benefits of their conspiracy.”); United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 103
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“[A] remedies decree in an antitrust case must seek to . . .
‘deny to the defendant the fruits of its statutory violation . . . .’”).
4 See FTC v. Munoz, 17 Fed. Appx. 624, 626 (9th Cir. 2001); FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530
(7th Cir. 1997); FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466 (11th Cir. 1996); FTC v. Security
Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312 (8th Cir. 1991); FTC v. Southwest Sunsites,
Inc., 665 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1982); FTC v. Ameridebt, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 558 (D. Md.
2005); FTC v. Mylan Labs., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 36–37 (D.D.C. 1999).
5 See Reply Brief for the United States at 4 & n.3, United States v. Philip Morris USA,
Inc., 546 U.S. 690 (2005) (No. 05-92); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Court Finds
Smith International and Schlumberger Ltd. Guilty of Criminal Contempt for Violating
Consent Decree (Dec. 9, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_re-
leases/1999/3948.htm; Settlement Agreement and Order at 3, United States v. Cal Drive
Int’l. Inc., No. 1:05CV02041 (D.D.C. Nov. 26, 2007).
6 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI-
TRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 325a (3d ed. 2006). As the Areeda treatise2009] DISGORGEMENT 81
concluded that the ability of antitrust agencies to secure disgorgement
as a remedy was so well-established that there was no need to clarify it.7
Still, while its formal availability is clear, there is also no doubt that
disgorgement has, so far, rarely been pursued in antitrust cases. The
DOJ apparently has done so only in those two contempt actions. Al-
though the FTC regularly pursues equitable monetary remedies for con-
sumer protection violations, it has done so in only eleven antitrust
cases.8 The FTC has also issued a policy statement indicating it intends
to seek disgorgement only in “exceptional cases.”9 The statement says
the FTC will consider three factors before seeking equitable monetary
remedies.
One factor is that “there must be a reasonable basis for calculating the
amount of a remedial payment.”10 This factor seems obviously neces-
sary—one can hardly bring a claim for disgorgement without calculating
the amount to be disgorged. However, it also seems clear this factor can
often be met. Indeed, even where this analysis is difficult, it may well be
easier to calculate the amount of illicit profits than it is to calculate the
amount of harm to each victim. This factor thus often provides an im-
portant advantage to disgorgement suits over claims for damages. (By
the way, this is why I will focus on equitable claims for disgorgement,
rather than on equitable claims for restitution that, like damage suits,
generally require ascertaining the harm to the victims.)
The other two factors the FTC names are (1) the clarity of the viola-
tion and (2) the extent to which other remedies, such as private actions,
would afford an adequate monetary remedy. The policy statement indi-
indicates, in theory, private parties could also seek disgorgement. But that remedy would
seem to be unavailable in any case where they could prove damages to themselves, be-
cause that would give them an adequate remedy at law. And when they could not prove
their damages, it is unclear whether they would receive any disgorged funds, thus lessen-
ing their incentive to sue. Perhaps some courts might allow private parties to seek the
creation of a disgorgement fund to generally benefit some set of market participants in a
case where damages to particular market participants cannot be established. However,
pursuing this sort of strategy via individual actions would still be discouraged by the fact
that most of the benefits would go to others who are not funding the litigation, and doing
so via class actions would still face the common impact obstacles noted below. In any
event, I do not know of any private antitrust case where, this has been attempted, so we so
far seem to lack any direct antitrust precedent on the issue in either direction.
7 See ANTITRUST M ODERNIZATION C OMM’N, REPORT AND R ECOMMENDATIONS 286–88
(2007) [hereinafter AMC REPORT],  available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/re-
port_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf.
8 See id. at 286.
9 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competi-
tion Cases, 68 Fed. Reg. 45,820, 45,821 (Aug. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Policy Statement on
Monetary Equitable Remedies].
10 Id.82 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76
cates an intention to weigh those two factors against each other in a
sliding scale sort of analysis.
The FTC’s justification for requiring some special degree of clarity is
that this ensures the remedy serves a desirable deterrence function. But
deterrence concerns also apply to antitrust damages, and the FTC state-
ment offers no justification for why the degree of clarity necessary to
recover damages should be lower than that to obtain public disgorge-
ment. If anything, concerns that unclarity might deter desirable conduct
should be lower for public disgorgement claims, given that they are un-
trebled and brought only when financially disinterested government of-
ficials believe the suit is meritorious. And although the deterrence of
undesirable conduct is certainly most effective when the illegal nature of
that conduct is clear in advance, it is also true that, if we have some set
of conduct that is more likely than not to be harmful, then deterring it
will, on balance, be beneficial.
Moreover, when a monopolist has actually acquired profits through
illegal conduct, it is hard to see what principle of justice justifies the
monopolist retaining those ill-gotten gains just because the monopolist
was not certain how illegal that conduct was in advance. One might add
that, as a practical matter, so little is clear-cut about monopolization
standards,11 that requiring high levels of advance clarity would effectively
sideline disgorgement as a remedy for misconduct by a dominant firm.
This would be unfortunate because, as we shall see, disgorgement may
be a particularly attractive remedy for dominant firm misconduct.
The remaining FTC factor may really drive the analysis, for much of
the hostility toward disgorgement seems based on the general view that
private treble damages generally provide monetary relief that goes well
beyond disgorgement, so that disgorgement is typically unnecessary.12
The FTC policy statement is careful not to buy into this general view too
much: it stresses that the general view might not apply in some cases,
not only when statutes of limitations bar private claims, but also when a
large aggregate injury is inflicted on many small buyers whose stakes do
not justify suit or when the direct purchasers who have exclusive stand-
ing will not sue.13 In practice, however, the rareness with which it has
pursued disgorgement suggests the FTC has believed that private ac-
tions usually do force defendants to disgorge the profits from their viola-
11 See generally Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV.
253 (2003) [hereinafter Defining Better Monopolization Standards].
12 See, e.g., AMC REPORT, supra note 7, at 287.
13 See Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies, supra note 9, at 45,822.2009] DISGORGEMENT 83
tions. The DOJ must have believed it even more, for it has so far never
brought an ordinary disgorgement claim in an antitrust case.
II. DO THE CONVENTIONAL REASONS STILL
SUPPORT RARE USAGE?
The rare usage of disgorgement actions thus seems to have been
based mainly on a general premise that private actions already provide
adequate monetary relief, so that disgorgement claims would not pro-
vide an additional benefit and in fact might generate over-deterrence.
But the adequacy of private actions seems increasingly dubious, espe-
cially in monopolization cases.
Such monopolization cases are particularly likely to involve direct pur-
chasers who are intermediaries, like dealers, who pass on most if not all
of the anticompetitive costs downstream, are reluctant to provoke the
ire of the dominant supplier in their market, and may sometimes even
get a share of the supracompetitive profits.14 Such direct purchasers are
often unwilling to sue.15 And the indirect purchasers who suffer most of
the harm lack federal standing to sue under Illinois Brick, a doctrine that
sounded sensible at the time, but increasingly looks like a mistake that
has perversely undercut its own goals of encouraging vigorous antitrust
enforcement and avoiding duplicative damages.16
When suit is possible by consumers who cannot pass on any of the
costs further downstream, their stakes are usually too low to make indi-
vidual lawsuits feasible, especially given the enormous costs of antitrust
litigation. It is striking that the FTC policy statement indicates this sort
of circumstance is one that supports a disgorgement action. One might
have thought the FTC would simply say that we have class actions to
address the problem of numerous low-stakes plaintiffs. But it did not,
perhaps because the FTC implicitly recognized that the standards for
certifying antitrust class actions have become increasingly difficult to
meet for even the most meritorious of cases.
Where once courts recognized that, because antitrust cases involve
marketwide injuries, they are uniquely suitable for class action treat-
ments, many courts now seem willing to accept arguments that in
14 See Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, supra note 11, at 288–92.
15 See William H. Page, Class Certification in the Microsoft Indirect Purchaser Litigation, 1 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 303, 314–15 & n.69 (2005) (noting that the computer makers
who were the largest direct purchasers generally did not sue Microsoft after it was found
liable in the government litigation).
16 See, e.g., AMC REPORT, supra note 7, at 267 (advocating the repeal of the doctrine
established in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977)).84 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76
markets with product differentiation, buyer negotiation, or price dis-
crimination, injuries are individuated in a way that undermines com-
mon proof of injury, even when the case involves horizontal price
fixing.17 Acceptance of this narrow view in the cases is far from uni-
form.18 I myself would say that one can infer that the narrow view re-
flects neither sound policy nor a tenable reading of the role class actions
were meant to have from the fact that the narrow view has logically led
its advocates to the Catch-22 conclusion that courts generally should not
certify any antitrust class actions because one needs to analyze individual
data to determine if there was a common impact.19 Indeed, by requiring
precise calculations of the but-for price for each class member, the nar-
row view imposes a higher burden of proof than would be imposed in
an individual case, where proof of injury can be uncertain and any rea-
sonable approximation of the amount of damages suffices.20 The narrow
view also generally fixates on variations that exist in both the actual and
but-for worlds, ignoring the fact such variations cancel each other out
when ascertaining injury and damages.21
But the point for present purposes is not whether the trend toward
the narrow view on antitrust class actions is right or wrong. The point is
that the reality of this trend supports having our antitrust agencies take
up the slack left by the increasing barriers to antitrust class actions by
bringing more disgorgement suits. This is particularly so if the real mo-
tive for this trend is the belief that financially interested class action at-
torneys cannot be trusted with important social policy decisions about
how best to regulate markets, because that belief naturally suggests that
this power should instead be shifted to disinterested government
agencies.
17 See Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562 (8th Cir. 2005); Ian Simmons et al., Without
Presumptions: Rigorous Analysis in Class Certification Proceedings, ANTITRUST, Summer 2007, at
61 (noting and applauding a trend toward denying certification of antitrust class actions).
18 See, e.g., William H. Page, Introduction: Reexamining the Standards for Certification of Anti-
trust Class Actions, ANTITRUST, Summer 2007, at 53, 54 & n.13 (noting that some cases
continue to adhere to the traditional approach to certifying antitrust class actions); Ellen
Meriwether, Rigorous Analysis in Certification of Antitrust Class Actions: A Plaintiff’s Perspective,
ANTITRUST, Summer 2007, at 55, 59 (arguing that cases adhering to the traditional ap-
proach are correct).
19 See John H. Johnson & Gregory K. Leonard, Economics and the Rigorous Analysis of Class
Certification in Antitrust Cases, 3 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 341 (2007). Among other
things, this conclusion seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court opinion distinguishing
mass tort class actions from antitrust class actions on the ground that “[p]redominance is
a test readily met in certain cases alleging consumer or securities fraud or violations of the
antitrust laws.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997). Under the
narrow view, predominance is never readily met in any antitrust class action.
20 See EINER ELHAUGE, UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW & ECONOMICS 19–23 (2008).
21 Id. at 29–30 & n.114.2009] DISGORGEMENT 85
But, you may wonder, are not suits by the excluded rivals more than
adequate to deter illegal monopolization?22 Generally not. Part of the
problem is that it is too easy to cut side deals with rivals through settle-
ments that may satisfy the financial interests of the rivals but fail to fix
(or even worsen) the anticompetitive problem. The more fundamental
problem is that any rival claim will be limited to the competitive profits
the rival could have earned on some share of the market in the but-for
world. A monopolist will generally find it profitable to pay such low com-
petitive profits on a smaller market share out of the monopoly profits it
gains on its monopoly market share.23 Such rival claims are thus unlikely
to result in complete disgorgement of illicit gains.
Finally, some unilateral misconduct is not covered by private antitrust
actions, either because the firm has single-firm market power but does
not quite have monopoly power nor the specific intent to qualify as an
attempted monopolist, or the firm is an oligopolist engaged in unilat-
eral conduct that facilitates that oligopoly. In such cases outside the
scope of Sherman Act Section 2, the only available claim is under the
FTC Act, for which the only remedies are equitable. Thus, without equi-
table monetary remedies, such misconduct could not be effectively de-
terred. The need for such FTC enforcement only increases if, as in the
recent Rambus case, courts (in my view incorrectly) narrowly interpret
Sherman Act Section 2 not to cover some conduct that results in an-
ticompetitive price increases.24
22 See Page, supra note 15, at 335 (suggesting they were adequate in Microsoft).
23 One might think the trebling of damages would adjust for this, but there is no reason
to think that rival lost profits equal one-third the total anticompetitive cost. Moreover,
treble damages in practice provide closer to single damages because antitrust plaintiffs
usually cannot recover prejudgment interest, deadweight loss harm, or umbrella effect
overcharges. See ELHAUGE, supra note 20, at 14–15; Robert H. Lande, Five Myths About
Antitrust Damages, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 651 (2006). Expected damages are even lower than
that once adjusted for the odds and costs of detection and successful adjudication.
24 See Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The court held that deceiving
a standard-setting organization into adopting a standard for which a member had undis-
closed patents does not violate Sherman Act Section 2 where the causation finding was
that, absent the misconduct, the organization would have either adopted alternative tech-
nologies or negotiated a lower price. Id. at 463–64. The court reasoned that the latter
possible effect would not have been “exclusionary” conduct covered by the Act. Id. I ex-
press no view on whether the FTC’s findings on deception and alternative causation were
correct in the particular case because the relevant issue here is the court’s conclusion that
such findings would not suffice to find liability as matter of law. The problem with the
court’s legal reasoning is that, if the findings were correct, then the higher prices resulted
because the conduct gave the deceiving member an ex post monopoly when it otherwise
would have faced ex ante competition to be included in the standard—that is, the higher
prices resulted precisely because of the exclusion of competition. In all anticompetitive
conduct cases, it is true that, with competition, buyers might either have bought else-
where or used the competitive alternatives as leverage for lower prices. In a price-fixing
cartel case, for example, buyers may have bought from the same sellers they would have86 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76
In short, going by the FTC’s own statement of the relevant factors, it
would seem that those factors now call for increased usage of disgorge-
ment claims, given the increasing inability of private damage claims to
deter antitrust misconduct and force wrongdoers to cough up their il-
licit booty.
III. WOULD DISGORGEMENT IMPROVE ON OTHER
GOVERNMENT REMEDIES?
One might further wonder whether the whole framing of the issue by
the conventional analysis has things backwards. In it, disgorgement rem-
edies are cast as the understudy, to be employed only when private ac-
tors are unable to perform their role. But it is not the case that antitrust
agencies generally defer when private actions can seek the same remedy.
After all, private parties can also generally pursue injunctive relief, and
the agencies do not take this as a reason to forgo injunctive claims. To
be sure, when monetary claims are at issue, one might fear duplicative
recoveries, but as the FTC policy statement noted, courts have devel-
oped various offsets to avoid such duplication.25 If the public disgorge-
ment claim succeeds before private actions are terminated, the proceeds
can simply be held in escrow in cases where there is a serious concern
that the combination may result in monetary payments that exceed
treble the total harm the conduct inflicted.
Rather than focusing on whether disgorgement would add something
useful to private damage remedies, perhaps the agencies should focus
on whether disgorgement would add something useful to the current
set of regulatory equitable remedies that the government normally uses.
Consider the fact that, under the recent Bush Administration, the
DOJ failed to bring a single monopolization case challenging unilateral
or vertical conduct in its eight years.26 Now, there are many possible ex-
planations for bringing zero monopolization cases, and from the per-
spective of an outsider without access to the files, it is hard to be sure
which explanation is right. Perhaps the last eight years witnessed a re-
bought from without the cartel, just at a higher price. The mistaken logic of the D.C.
Circuit would suggest that, absent proof that a cartel changes who buyers purchase from,
the cartel does not “harm the competitive process.”  Id. at 463 (stressing that this is the test
of what conduct counts as “exclusionary”).  The Court’s reliance on NYNEX v. Discon was
quite mistaken, for there the deception was alleged to directly raise prices by fraud with-
out any creation of market power. 525 U.S. 128 (1998). Here, in contrast, the deception
was found to have created a monopoly power that otherwise would not have existed, and
it is that monopoly power that was used to raise prices.
25 See Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies, supra note 9, at 45,823 & n.16.
26 I exclude a couple of cases involving horizontal combinations where a Section 2
claim was made but added nothing substantive to the other antitrust claims.2009] DISGORGEMENT 87
markable degree of law-abiding behavior by monopolists. Perhaps the
DOJ has wrongly accepted the single monopoly profit theory, notwith-
standing all the economic work disproving this theory.27 But I think the
most defensible rationale for the recent lack of enforcement has to do
with a widespread view that, even if the agencies could have won a mo-
nopolization case, the structural or behavioral remedies they could have
obtained would generally have been unwise or ineffective.
United States v. Microsoft is often offered as Exhibit A for this view.28
The case resulted in a unanimous judgment affirming liability by a panel
of D.C. Circuit judges that included some of the smartest and most con-
servative antitrust minds around. And yet the victory was hollow, for ulti-
mately the remedy had no significant effect.
Structural remedies in Microsoft seemed unwise to many because they
could have created inefficiencies that harmed consumers rather than
benefited them. Breaking up the operating system would have deprived
the market of the beneficial network externalities created by a common
system, and many thought that the government’s requested remedy of
separating the operating system from the applications would have lost
desirable synergies from their combination.29 Nor could one quite say
that those structural remedies satisfied the traditional standard of being
necessary to undo the anticompetitive effects and ill-gotten gains,30 for
even without the anticompetitive conduct, Microsoft likely would have
had some sort of monopoly share in operating systems and leading
shares in many applications, so these remedies would likely have given
Microsoft lower market shares than it would have enjoyed without its
conduct.
So ultimately the chosen remedies were behavioral. Now, in my view,
the behavioral remedies settled for were far weaker than necessary, and
27 See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit
Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2009) (Harvard Olin Center Working Paper
629, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1345239 (summarizing literature on
why the single monopoly profit theory does not apply to tying or bundled discounts ab-
sent certain very limited conditions); Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards,
supra note 11, at 282–92 (explaining why the single monopoly profit theory does not
apply to other exclusionary conduct because buyers have incentives to agree to the extent
some of the anticompetitive effect is externalized onto other buyers either in the same
market or further downstream).
28 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).
29 See, e.g., John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Devising a Microsoft Remedy that Serves
Consumers, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 691, 709–11 (2001); Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory
Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 77–90 (2001).
30 See ELHAUGE, supra note 20, at 25.88 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76
thus predictably ineffectual from the start.31 But the fact is that even the
best-designed behavioral remedies have difficulty really changing the
operation of markets, create perverse incentives, and are hard to admin-
ister, which is why the U.S. agencies generally favor structural remedies
over behavioral ones.32 Behavioral remedies are even less likely to
achieve the goal of depriving the violator of the fruits of its violation.
Moreover, as stressed by the D.C. Circuit, there was a generic problem
with applying injunctive remedies to antitrust violations in innovation
industries. By the time the typically lengthy antitrust litigation is done,
the problem will often have changed, so that agencies are often put in
the position of trying to remedy a problem that once was real, but now
has become mooted and perhaps replaced by a new one.33
Nor are these problems unique to Microsoft. In monopolization cases,
structural remedies often create problems because not all of the defen-
dant’s monopoly power was caused by its anticompetitive conduct.
Structural remedies thus often cannot legally be obtained because they
would be overbroad, and even if they could, they frequently can achieve
the goal of denying the defendant the fruits of its violation only at the
expense of creating inefficiencies that harm consumers.34 Behavioral
remedies are generally problematic and difficult to enforce35 and, even
when otherwise effective, do not deprive the defendant of past ill-gotten
gains. High-tech industries probably pose the greatest monopolization
concerns because of the relative ease with which monopoly power can
be acquired and abused, and yet also involve the sort of innovative pace
that makes it hard for antitrust injunctions to keep up.36 Even outside of
the high-tech world, firms are most motivated to engage in exclusionary
conduct when their monopoly power is waning and they want to slow
down its erosion.37 Thus, it will often be the case that, by the time the
case is resolved, their monopoly power will have waned enough to moot
31 See Einer Elhauge, Soft on Microsoft, WEEKLY STANDARD, Mar. 25, 2002, at 17.
32 See U.S. DEP’TO F  JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES
7–9 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf.
33 See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 48–49.
34 See Lopatka & Page, supra note 29, at 707 (noting that divestiture can rarely be ob-
tained as a remedy for exclusionary conduct by a monopolist).
35 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 273 (2d ed. 2001) (calling “‘regulatory de-
crees’ . . . a confession of failure to restore competitive conditions and a sign that the case
was probably ill conceived”).
36 See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 29, at 36–38 (collecting literature on the greater
anticompetitive concerns in high-tech cases, and arguing they are countered by greater
difficulties in defining injunctive remedies).
37 See Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, supra note 11, at 337–38.2009] DISGORGEMENT 89
structural or behavioral remedies, even if the erosion of their power had
been slowed down by anticompetitive conduct.
It is thus not hard to imagine a sensible DOJ official concluding after
the termination of the Microsoft case that it simply might not be worth
bringing similar monopolization claims, no matter how meritorious, be-
cause they require a large expenditure of resources, and, even if the
government wins, it loses, in the sense that it has no useful remedy to
obtain. If you do not think you have any useful remedies available, the
number zero starts to make a lot more sense as the number of enforce-
ment actions you would bring.
But all this looks quite different if one takes seriously the option of
pursuing disgorgement claims. Even though much of a firm’s monopoly
share may not be due to its anticompetitive conduct, one can estimate
the share that was, and then use economic models to calculate the price
and profit effect from the misconduct in question.38 Monetizing the de-
gree of illicit gains allows far more fine-grained judgments than struc-
tural relief can provide. Moreover, disgorgement does not require a
restructuring that may create inefficiencies that would harm consumers.
Disgorgement is also much more enforceable than behavioral remedies
because it is clear-cut whether the defendant has complied with the or-
der. Finally, disgorgement neatly avoids the problem of antitrust cases
being mooted by subsequent industry developments, for however the
industry changes, there remains a live issue about whether past profits
should be disgorged, and the prospect of such relief will deter anticom-
petitive conduct.39
For all these reasons, disgorgement may be the remedy that offers a
potential cure for the recent paralysis of DOJ enforcement in monopoli-
zation cases. Lacking any adequate remedy in standard regulatory forms
of equitable relief, monetary relief seems more appropriate.
IV. EXCESSIVE PRICING AS A DISGORGEMENT CLAIM
Disgorgement theory might also be useful on the other side of the
Atlantic, helping to provide an answer to the puzzle of what to do with
the European Community Treaty provision that condemns excessive
38 See ELHAUGE, supra note 20, at 22–23.
39 See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 29, at 97–99 (arguing for similar reasons that dis-
gorgement should have been considered as an equitable remedy in the Microsoft case). On
the other hand, if the conduct has not yet resulted in ill-gotten gains, then disgorgement
will not be an effective remedy, but injunctive remedies ending the misconduct or its
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pricing.40 The reason this provision is puzzling is that, on its face, it
seems to condemn the possession of dominant market power itself, for
any firm with such power could be said to be pricing excessively. Such
condemnation would be perverse, given that firms generally enjoy mar-
ket power because they invested in developing some product or process
than offers efficiencies over the alternative market options, for which
higher profits are their just reward, a reward we want them to get so as
to encourage such efficient investments.41 High prices also provide an
important market signal that encourages other firms to enter, which
would create competition that is more desirable than price regulation
and does not raise the same administrative difficulties. Nor does the EC
seem to hold the view that all pricing that reflects earned market power
is excessive pricing, for if it did, it would routinely bring excessive pric-
ing claims. Indeed, such excessive pricing would seem the far more obvi-
ous and easily provable claim to bring against Microsoft, but the EC
never pursued it. Instead, excessive pricing claims by the EC seem, if
anything, even rarer than U.S. disgorgement claims.42
Perhaps the best way to make sense of excessive pricing doctrine is to
understand it as something far narrower. To the extent the excessive
pricing provision adds something to the EC Treaty’s prohibition of price
discrimination,43 perhaps we should understand it as a claim designed to
40 Treaty Establishing the European Community (consolidated version), art. 82(a),
Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321E) 1, 74 (an abuse of a dominant position may consist in
“directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices . . . .”); Case 27/76,
United Brands Co. v. Comm’n, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 215 (holding that this provision makes it
illegal for a dominant firm to charge excessive prices).
41 See Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, supra note 11, at 332 (“[W]hen a
firm uses proper conduct to create something sufficiently more valuable than existing
market options to enjoy dominant market power, then any high prices it earns are the
proper social reward for that creation, and the denial of that reward by E.C. law seems . . .
unsound.”); Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive out Entrants Are Not Preda-
tory—and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE L.J. 681, 796 (2003)
(“We thus must be careful not to act as if the purpose of antitrust laws were to eliminate
monopoly profits themselves. Such profits are an extremely valuable inducement to the
creation of better or cheaper products.”); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and
the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important
element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least
for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk
taking that produces innovation and economic growth.”).
42 See EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW & ECONOMICS 254
(2007).
43 Some cases framed as excessive pricing cases really seem to be cases about price
discrimination that is not justified by cost differences, which adds nothing to the separate
prohibition of such price discrimination under EU law. See, e.g., Case 27/76,  United
Brands Co. v. Comm’n, 1978 E.C.R. 207; Treaty Establishing the European Community
(consolidated version), art. 82(c), Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321E) 1, 74–75.2009] DISGORGEMENT 91
deal with the gap that otherwise would be left because EU law prohibits
the abuse “of” a dominant position, but does not prohibit anticompeti-
tive conduct that is used to obtain that dominant position in the first
place.44 In such a case, the anticompetitive conduct that led to the acqui-
sition of dominance cannot itself be called an abuse “of” the dominant
position because it preceded the existence of that position. But one
could say that any excessive pricing that followed the improper acquisi-
tion of dominance was an abuse “of” that dominant position. In con-
trast, when the dominant position was earned through desirable
conduct, then any high prices are a just reward for that conduct. Thus,
while an “exercise” of a dominant position, such high pricing should not
be considered an “abuse” of it, because the meaning of the word “abuse”
is limited to undesirable actions. In short, Article 82 should be inter-
preted to deem excessive pricing an abuse of a dominant position only
when that position was obtained by abusive conduct.45 Here, at last, we
have a textually plausible interpretation of this provision that would ac-
tually make policy sense.
To be sure, the best remedy for a claim that the illicit acquisition of
dominance led to excessive pricing might be some sort of structural re-
lief—breaking up the dominant firm to resemble what it would have
looked like without the anticompetitive conduct. But another natural
remedy for an excessive pricing claim, which might often be more at-
tractive, would be to force the firm to disgorge the price excesses it
earned because of the anticompetitive conduct. In short, we could un-
derstand excessive pricing claims as a vehicle for a disgorgement
remedy.
Such a disgorgement remedy seems especially appropriate in the EU,
where the argument is much less plausible that private actions are al-
ready adequate to secure disgorgement. This is because, in the EU, un-
like the United States, private plaintiffs generally cannot obtain the
discovery necessary to bring an antitrust claim, can get only single dam-
ages, and must usually pay fees and costs if they lose.46
44 See Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, supra note 11, at 331–32.
45 See Lars-Hendrik R¨ oller, Exploitative Abuses 9–13 (European School of Management
and Technology, Business Brief No. BB-107-002, 2007) (taking this position), available at
http://www.esmt.org/fm/294/BB-107-002_Roeller_Expoitative_Abuses.pdf; cf. Emil Pau-
lis, Article 82 EC and Exploitative Conduct, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2007
515, 518–19 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Mel Marquis eds., 2008) (arguing that this gap
might explain why the EU has an excessive pricing claim but not advocating that excessive
pricing claims be limited to cases where the dominant power was acquired illicitly).
46 See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 42, at 43.92 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76
Perhaps an EU court would conclude that such a disgorgement claim
is implicitly precluded by the limits on the fines the European Commis-
sion can impose.47 However, U.S. limits on agency fines have not been
interpreted to preclude disgorgement claims. Further, because excessive
pricing is itself an infringement of Article 82, the Commission’s author-
ity to enter orders ending any infringement could be interpreted to in-
clude orders undoing the excessive prices by ordering disgorgement of
the price excesses.48
This sort of approach to excessive pricing might also help address a
current gap in EU merger law. In a recent case, the FTC sued to undo a
merger four years after it occurred, on the ground that prices went up
after the merger and thus showed the merger had in fact turned out to
be anticompetitive, even if that had not been sufficiently clear to bring a
challenge before the merger.49 EU merger law does not seem to provide
any authority to undo retroactively a properly notified merger that the
Commission concluded should not be blocked when it occurred. How-
ever, if a merger creates a dominant position that leads to increased
prices, it would seem the EC could bring an excessive pricing claim
against the merged firm that, if coupled with seeking a break-up remedy
for the excessive pricing, would effectively be the same as the FTC suit.
Disgorgement of merger-created profits might also be a remedy that ei-
ther the EU or U.S. agencies could pursue.
This might be a quite helpful doctrine. In particular, consider a case
where it is a close question whether a merger is anticompetitive or
procompetitive. In such close cases, regulators could allow the merger,
figuring they could always reduce the costs of Type II errors after the
fact by suing to undo, or disgorge profits from, a merger that turned out
to actually be anticompetitive. The prospect of stronger post-merger
remedies should, in short, make it optimal to be less aggressive in block-
ing mergers in the first place.
Lars-Hendrik R¨ oller worries that such retroactive actions would in-
crease Type I errors because it would create two opportunities for erro-
neous condemnation.50 However, he fails to consider the fact that the
availability of retroactive remedies should make the agency less willing
47 See Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003, art. 23(2), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 17.
48 See id. art. 7, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, 9.
49 Although the Commission upheld the power to seek retroactive divestiture, it ulti-
mately decided this was the unusual case where behavioral remedies were preferable to
structural ones. See Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., FTC Docket No. 9315, Opinion of the
Commission at 89 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/070806opin-
ion.pdf.
50 R¨ oller, supra note 45, at 10.2009] DISGORGEMENT 93
to bring uncertain prospective cases. Indeed, if the enforcer is acting
optimally, it should choose the retroactive approach over the prospec-
tive one only when doing so reduces the combination of expected
overdeterrence and underdeterrence. Adding the option thus cannot
worsen over- and underdeterrence unless the agency fails to use its
power wisely.
V. REMAINING QUALMS
Still, I suspect that, for many, qualms may remain about allowing gov-
ernment officials in the United States or the EU to bring disgorgement
claims. But I think the above suggests the deeper source of those qualms
is not really that alternative remedies are better placed to optimally reg-
ulate conduct. Instead, the deeper qualms are that the government
might abuse such a power rather than employ it optimally.
One deep-rooted concern is, I think, the fear that it simply gives gov-
ernment officials too much power to have them regularly bring actions
for disgorgement of ill-gotten monopoly profits. This is a serious con-
cern, and one would want to make sure the process for bringing such
cases was not distorted by political bias. But this is hardly a concern
unique to federal antitrust agencies. After all, U.S. antitrust law quite
explicitly gives states the right to bring a parens patriae action on behalf
of its residents.51 Likewise, the SEC routinely seeks disgorgement in its
enforcement actions. It is hard to see why state antitrust enforcers or
federal securities agencies should be deemed more reliable or less worri-
some than federal antitrust agencies. Indeed, the former raise greater
concerns, both because the state antitrust actions are for treble damages
and because the SEC actions largely result in transfers from  some inno-
cent shareholders to other innocent shareholders.
One would also, in all public disgorgement cases, have the protection
not only of a disinterested agency process, but also review by indepen-
dent courts. This is, if anything, more protective of defendants than the
process in a properly certified class action. Moreover, the alternative to
having the government seek monetary equitable relief is generally for it
to seek regulatory forms of equitable relief. Such regulatory relief raises
similar concerns about political bias, while, in addition, raising concerns
about heavy-handed government regulation whose costs are harder to
ascertain and police because they are less salient and quantifiable.
Another concern might be that the prospect of making hundreds of
millions of dollars through a disgorgement claim could make govern-
51 15 U.S.C. § 15c.94 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76
ment officials overzealous. This might be a particular concern in the
cases where disgorgement is most useful as a remedy—namely, the cases
where it is hard to calculate the harm to specific individuals but easier to
calculate the illicit profits to disgorge—because those are the very cases
where the disgorged funds are likely to go to the government.52 One
would not want government officials pursuing dubious antitrust cases
because the expected proceeds exceeded the litigation costs in a way
that made such cases a profit center. On the other hand, meritorious
injunctive suits are often politically undervalued because they result in
no easily quantifiable benefit. Probably the best way to minimize distor-
tion is to make sure that, when there is no practicable way of delivering
disgorged profits to the victims, such disgorgement proceeds should go
to the general treasury and not affect the budget of the agencies. Which,
conveniently enough, is precisely what U.S. law provides.53
VI. CONCLUSION
In short, the disfavored status of disgorgement as an antitrust remedy
is somewhat puzzling. Like all remedies, it raises problems. But the alter-
native government remedies often are ineffective or raise even worse
problems. Their regulatory nature often makes them inefficient or over-
burdensome, and narrowing their use to avoid these problems often
makes them ineffectual or illusory. Disgorgement neatly avoids these
problems by monetizing the obligation in a way that eliminates any need
for government and judicial entanglement in ongoing business opera-
tions. It replaces intrusive command-and-control forms of regulation
with less intrusive, and often more efficient, regulation via a price
mechanism.
Indeed, one might wonder whether the question should not be asked
in reverse. After all, the traditional standard for injunctive relief is not
that damages should be pursued only when injunctive relief is inade-
quate; it is that injunctive relief should be granted only when damages
cannot provide an adequate remedy.54 The best justification for this
traditional standard is that damages require less judicial intrusion into
the ongoing conduct of private parties. Because the government cannot
obtain damages in a typical antitrust case, the closest it has to a claim for
damages is a claim for disgorgement. The justification for the traditional
standard thus suggests that the government should look first to bringing
52 See, e.g., FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1997); FTC v. Gem Merch.
Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 470 (11th Cir. 1996).
53 See 31 U.S.C. § 1341; 31 U.S.C. § 3302; AT&T v. United States, 177 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
54 See, e.g., Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 925 (1988).2009] DISGORGEMENT 95
a disgorgement claim and bring a claim for regulatory injunctive relief
like divestiture or behavioral orders only when disgorgement would be
inadequate. This seems opposite to the current U.S. government agency
approach of looking mainly to regulatory forms of injunctive relief and
disfavoring monetary forms.
One might answer that the government should not pursue any equita-
ble remedies—monetary or regulatory—unless damage actions by pri-
vate parties have been shown to be inadequate. But that would be a
revolution in antitrust enforcement—among other things, it would sug-
gest that generally the government should not challenge any mergers
because private parties could always pursue damage actions after the
fact against any mergers that actually raise prices. In any event, even if
that were the right standard, the fact is that private damage actions are
often inadequate, especially given the bars to suits by indirect purchas-
ers who suffer most of the harm and the increasing obstacles to class
actions and monopolization cases.
Perhaps a more serious concern is that disgorgement might be too
modest a remedy. To fully deter misconduct, one would want the pen-
alty to equal the total harm created by the conduct divided by the ex
ante probability of detection and successful adjudication. Disgorgement
of illicit profits does not cover the total harm because it excludes the
harm created by either the deadweight loss or the umbrella effect on
rival prices.55 Disgorgement also fails to give any adjustment for the odds
that misconduct might not be detected or successfully punished. Fully
redressing cases where private damage suits and alternative government
remedies are inadequate may thus require the authority to impose fines
adequate to achieve optimal deterrence.56 But such a broad fining au-
thority does not exist under the current statutory scheme, while dis-
gorgement authority does, and pursuing disgorgement claims can at
least reduce some of the shortfall in deterrence, as well as achieve the
goal of depriving the antitrust wrongdoer of its illicit loot.
55 Disgorgement can, on the other hand, avoid the problem that damages usually do
not compensate for prejudgment interest by measuring disgorged profits to include the
normal rate of return the wrongdoer earned (or could have earned) on illicit profits. I
would not recommend having disgorged profits include actual returns on illicit profits,
because that would treat efficient investments of illicitly gained funds worse than ineffi-
cient investments of such funds, thus discouraging efficient investment decisions that are
unrelated to the wrongdoing.
56 Concerns that disgorgement might lead to excessive penalties over and above private
treble damages would be avoided if, as I have suggested above, the funds are held in
escrow pending private actions to avoid exceeding triple the total harm.